Sentencing Round-up: Case in Focus
Our Sentencing Round-up contains case summaries from select, recent decisions that explain or clarify sentencing laws and approaches in Queensland. This page will be updated as relevant cases are published. The summaries are not a substitute for the Court’s reasons. The only authoritative statement of the Court’s reasons and conclusions is contained in the judgment.
For other publicly available Queensland court decisions, visit: Supreme Court Library Queensland
October 2026
Adult offender sentenced for dangerous operation of a vehicle causing grievous bodily harm: Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA)
Court: Court of Appeal
Issue: Clarifying the Verdins principles and how the offender’s psychiatric and cognitive impairment is relevant to the sentence.
The Court of Appeal allowed the Attorney-General’s application to appeal against a head sentence for dangerous operation of a vehicle causing grievous bodily harm. The original 5 years prison sentence, suspended after 9 months (15% of the head sentence) served for an operational period of 5 years, was increased to 5 years imprisonment with a parole eligibility date after 18 months (one-third of the head sentence).
The 23-year-old respondent believed the 14-year-old victim had stolen a motorised dirt bike and pursued him by car for more than two kilometres. The respondent was driving dangerously, and collided with the bike, causing the victim to crash into a parked car and suffer serious leg injuries requiring surgery and rehabilitation.
At sentence, the respondent relied on evidence of his complex cognitive and psychological deficiencies as relevant to his decision to drive after the victim. Together with other mitigating features including his young age and plea of guilty, a lower time in actual custody was ordered, with a certain release date on a suspended prison sentence.
The Court of Appeal held 9 months actual custody (15% of the head sentence), was an ‘extraordinary low proportion’, and together with a suspended prison sentence, was not supported by the respondent’s personal features. [72] It emphasised the ‘objective circumstances of the offence … remain relevant to … both the head and bottom aspects of a sentence’. [73]
The Court of Appeal clarified that the Verdins principles are not just ‘matters of mitigation’. [83] In this case, when deciding the kind of sentence to be imposed (Verdins principle 2), the evidence supported a sentence requiring supervision on parole. [83]
Adult offender sentenced for coercive control: Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA)
Court: District Court 222 Appeal
Issue: Was it an error to impose prison when it was a sentence of last resort and was the sentence manifestly excessive?
The appellant appealed a sentence of 18 months’ imprisonment, with parole release after six months (head sentence), on the basis that it was manifestly excessive. The appeal was dismissed.
The appellant was 25 years old, with no prior convictions and pleaded guilty. The offending occurred between 7 July and 11 September 2025 against a previous partner. It involved monitoring her movements, accusing her of lying, demanding to know her location, sending her photos of her front door and her new boyfriend’s car, attempting to control her parenting decisions, to exclude her new boyfriend and bombarding her with messages. [18]
In assessing the seriousness of this offence, Cash DCJ placed particular weight on:
- the duration of offending,
- that the offending continued after a temporary protection order was made,
- the ‘invasive nature’ of the conduct, including surveillance of the victim and her boyfriend, and
- the implied threat to the children as a mechanism of control. [59]
Cash DCJ discussed whether there should be leniency because there was no ‘personal violence’ and the principle that imprisonment was a sentence of last resort applied. Cash DCJ held that, while coercive control offences will vary, sentencing purposes of denunciation and general deterrence and the maximum penalty ‘will compel the conclusion that the only appropriate sentence is one of imprisonment’. [73] In addition, ‘the absence of threatened or actual violence does not make this offending minor’. [78]
The decision provides important sentencing guidance for coercive control offences, including an explanation of how it differs from a breach of a protection order or stalking because of an intention to bring about a specific result and the higher maximum penalty. [70]–[72]
September 2026
Child offender sentenced for murder: Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) (YJA)
Court: Court of Appeal
Issue: Was it an error to declare the offence a ‘particular heinous offence’ (impacting the maximum penalty that applied) and not find ‘special circumstances’ (impacting the time to be served before release)?
An application for leave to appeal against sentence of 12 years detention, to serve 70 per cent, was refused. ACY was 17 years and 8 months at the time of fatally stabbing a friend three times following a dispute over a damaged mobile phone.
On appeal, it was argued that the sentencing judge made an error when declaring murder a ‘particularly heinous offence’ (YJA s 176(3)). This meant the maximum penalty was life in prison instead of 10 years. The Court of Appeal did not agree as the sentencing judge took into account ACY’s subjective factors (youth, disadvantaged background, intellectual impairment, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, substance abuse and early guilty plea), and balanced this with the objective seriousness of the offending, which outweighed those factors.
In addition, the Court held that the time to be served before release did not make the sentence manifestly excessive, as ‘special circumstances’ under s 227(2) of YJA involve broad evaluative judgments and permits a range of reasonable outcomes (applying The King v HCZ [2026] HCA 24).
NOTE: The offending in ACY occurred prior to the commencement of the Making Queensland Safer Act 2024 (Qld). Had the current legislative framework applied, ACY would have been subject to a mandatory life sentence for murder and a mandatory minimum non-parole period of 20 years. For further information about the sentencing of children, see the Council’s Guide to the sentencing of children in Queensland.
August 2026
Child offender sentenced for murder: Youth Justice Act 1992 (Qld) (YJA)
Court: High Court of Australia
Issue: Was it an error to find ‘special circumstances’ existed (impacting the time to be served before release) and what is the test courts must apply for sentence appeals?
The High Court allowed the Crown appeal, set aside the Court of Appeal orders and reinstated the sentence imposed at first instance. HCZ was aged 17 years and 8 months when he committed murder. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 14 years’ detention, to be released after 70 per cent (about 9 years and 10 months). On appeal, the sentence was reduced to release after 60 per cent (about 8 years and 5 months).
Section 227(2) of the YJA permits a court to order a child be released from detention after serving between 50–70 per cent of the sentence, where there are ‘special circumstances’. The sentencing judge found no special circumstances in this case, but the majority of the Court of Appeal (Boddice JA and Freeburn J) found this was an error, as insufficient weight had been given to HCZ’s guilty plea, deprived childhood and prospects of rehabilitation. Bond JA disagreed (dissented), considering the sentencing judge had considered all relevant factors.
The High Court agreed with Bond JA and emphasised that the assessment of ‘special circumstances’ under s 227(2) of YJA permits a range of reasonable outcomes and that the sentencing judge had considered the relevant mitigating factors. It was therefore not open to the Court of Appeal to substitute its own assessment merely because it would have reached a different conclusion. The original sentence was reinstated.
NOTE: The offending in HCZ occurred prior to the commencement of the Making Queensland Safer Act 2024 (Qld). Had the current legislative framework applied, HCZ would have been subject to a mandatory life sentence for murder and a mandatory minimum non-parole period of 20 years. For further information about the sentencing of children, see the Council’s Guide to the sentencing of children in Queensland.
July 2026
Keywords: DV as a mitigating factor (PSA, s 9(10B)); instinctive synthesis; parole release date before one-third; supplying drugs to correctional facility.
Adult offenders sentenced for child sexual offences: Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA)
Court: Court of Appeal
Issues: Should imprisonment lengths and parole eligibility dates be increased for each offender? How are good character references relevant for child sexual offences?
The Attorney-General’s appeal against the sentence for CD and LM was allowed and their sentences increased.
CD and LM, a married couple, were convicted, after trial, of rape and indecent treatment offences against a 15-year-old girl. CD was also convicted of supplying cannabis to a minor. CD was originally sentenced to 7 years imprisonment (head sentence) with parole eligibility set at less than one-third, which was increased to 8 years’ imprisonment with parole eligibility after 4 years; LM was originally sentenced to 6 years (head sentence) with parole eligibility set at less than one-quarter, which was increased to 7 years imprisonment with parole eligibility after 3 years.
The Court of Appeal noted that a sentencing judge may fix a parole eligibility date earlier than the legislated one-half, to recognise a guilty plea, remorse, cooperation and rehabilitation. [132] However, as neither CD or LM pleaded guilty and there was no evidence of other factors, there was no basis for the earlier parole eligibility dates.
The sentencing judge had referred to some other factors as the basis of the leniency for the earlier parole eligibility dates, including personal references speaking to LM and CD’s good character. The Court of Appeal noted care must be taken before accepting good character evidence in child sexual offences:
unquestioned acceptance of subjective, non-professional or irrelevant opinions about an offender’s risk of reoffending, or prospects of rehabilitation, is to be discouraged. An appearance that such views are being given weight, or worse, that character references are being considered as mitigating the seriousness of the offender’s criminality, is to be avoided. It may undermine the denunciation of the offender’s conduct. These considerations are in addition to the potential distress and trauma of a complainant when the Court gives status to personal praise for an offender. [89]
The Court concluded that:
[CD and LM’s] apparent good character assisted them in committing the sexual offences against the complainant. In the circumstances, the “good character” references should be given no weight. [94] citing PSA, ss 9(3A)–(3D), (6A); and R v KBQ [2026] QCA 123, [54]–[55]
The Court increased the head sentences and parole eligibility dates as they were inconsistent with the sentencing principles in PSA s 9(6) and community expectations. [200]
NOTE: From 1 November 2025, amendments to the PSA clarified the use of some types of good character evidence. For further information about the sentencing of adults, see the Council’s Queensland sentencing guide.
Adult offender sentenced for child sexual offences: Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) (PSA)
Court: Court of Appeal
Issue: How are good character references relevant for child sexual offences?
An appeal against a head sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment with parole eligibility after 18 months served, was dismissed. KBQ pleaded guilty to 9 sexual offences involving children, 7 offences involved contact against 2 different children aged between 5 and 9 years and 2 offences were making and possessing child exploitation material.
KBQ was a friend of the child victim’s parents and committed the offences while caring for the children. There were six character references from his friends and former colleagues who regarded him as a “good guy”, that the charges were “not part of his usual character” and they had never seen him act “odd or awkward” with a child.
On appeal, the Court noted good character evidence is only mitigating if it is relevant to rehabilitation or risk of offending (PSA ss 9(3A), (3B)). Though the support of family and friends is relevant to rehabilitation, placing weight on the opinion of referees about KBQ’s risk of re-offending or his prospects for rehabilitation would be inappropriate. [57] The Court found ‘The applicant’s good character … brought him into contact with those two children … So, good character, of itself, is not to be treated as a mitigating factor for any of the offences.’ [56] citing PSA ss 9(6A), (7AA)
NOTE: From 1 November 2025, amendments to the PSA clarified the use of some types of good character evidence. For further information about the sentencing of adults, see the Council’s Queensland sentencing guide.
Previous Sentencing Round-ups
The Sentencing Round-up was published as a quarterly PDF prior to 30 June 2026. Previous editions of the Sentencing Round-up can be found below:
Case in Focus
Our previous Case in Focus series summarised the legal and sentencing principles used in recent high profile or interesting appeal court decisions.
View the previous Case in Focus.